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1
ARGUMENT
I. The Appellant has provided sufficient record evidence to demonstrate that he was
denied the effective assistance of counsel.
The State argues in essence that (1) Mr. Reed did not cite record evidence in
support of his arguments, and (2) that Mr. Reed did not adequately brief his contentions.
The first argument begs the point. Competent trial counsel creates a record. And
yet, the only record trial counsel created is that she asked for the relevant evidence. 21-35.
Her motions themselves, pretrial, attest to what would have been necessary, both to
adequately present Mr. Reed's case to the jury, and to prepare a proper record for appeal.
The absence of that evidence in the record, or indeed any response to those motions,
attests that trial counsel failed to meet a minimum standard that she herself has
acknowledged by the limited record she did create.

.

The State's second argument raises two questions: (1) What is the difference
between a concise argument and an inadequate argument? and (2) Does failing to follow
through on discovery requests, failing to subpoena or object to the State's failure to
subpoena a witness, and failing to create an adequate record fall below an objective
standard of reasonableness that has prejudiced the client?
Mr. Reed's opening brief is concise, not inadequate. A simple argument is not an
inadequate argument. As pointed out in the opening brief (p. 5), the factual question
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before the jury was simple: Did Mr. Reed possess a gun? The record shows that trial
counsel requested good defense evidence. The record is devoid of that evidence precisely
because it was never provided to the defense. That is the whole point. The record, by its
very silence, bears record of the fact that the defense was denied the very materials which
the record clearly demonstrates counsel requested. This is not a question of whether
defense counsel made a strategic decision not to introduce evidence. This is a question of
whether the record demonstrates wishful thinking by defense counsel when positive
motions and positive objections were required to either obtain that evidence before trial or
postpone trial until it was obtained.
The case might be different if trial counsel had never filed the motions. It might
also be different if the court had denied the motions before trial, or if the court had
granted the motions and trial counsel failed to use the evidence so provided. Instead, the
record clearly sets forth the evidence that was requested, and the total failure by either
trial counsel or the court to follow through on those requests.
Megan Bale. As has already been pointed out, Aplt. Br. at 8, trial counsel did
intend to call Megan Bale as a witness. As the State has pointed out, the State's witnesses
confirmed that Bale's testimony would have been helpful to the defense. Aplee. Br. at 9;
165:189. But simply having an officer state that Ms. Bale so stated is a far cry from
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having Ms. Bale give her own full testimony in her own words. Moreover, the record is
clear that this was not a "strategic decision" on the part of trial counsel, but an unexpected
consolation she was able to obtain from a State's witness when Ms. Bale failed to appear.
The crucial question is whether trial counsel's failure to subpoena this critical witness,
and whether her failure to object when she learned the State had failed to subpoena her,
fell below an objective reasonable standard. The record is clear that, as of the day of trial,
trial counsel fully expected to call Ms. Bale as a witness, 165:11. The record also
indicates that it was not until the morning of trial that defense counsel learned Ms. Bale
had not been subpoenaed. The same record indicates, by the absence of any objection,
that trial counsel made no objection to proceeding to trial. The same record, 165:189,
proves that Ms. Bale's testimony would have aided the defense on the single crucial
question: Did Mr. Reed possess a gun?
It is objective fact, established by the record, that defense counsel intended to call
Ms. Bale, that defense counsel made no objection to proceeding without Ms. Bale, and
that Ms. Bale's testimony would have been helpful to the defense. The sole remaining
question is whether counsel's failure to object was a strategic maneuver, or an objective
failure to meet a minimum standard. Interestingly, the record is sufficient to determine
this question: After learning that the State had not subpoenaed Ms. Bale, defense counsel
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nevertheless stated her intention to call Ms. Bale as a witness if she should fortuitously
show up, and counsel requested that the court introduce Ms. Bale to the jury as a witness.
165:11. Thus we can see that the failure to object was not a strategic decision, but a
misunderstanding of the basic defense obligation to ensure that necessary defense
witnesses are secured for trial by subpoena. The Utah Supreme Court has found that
failure to raise a timely objection, as well as the failure to introduce defense evidence
known to defense counsel, does fall below an objective standard of competence. State v.
Ison, 135 P.3d 864, 871, 872, 2006 UT 26. Moreover, "[wjhere a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel is grounded in the absence of a record, a party may not gain the
benefit of the presumption of regularity without a showing that the party claiming error
consented to or acquiesced in the off-the-record treatment of a matter giving rise to the
ineffective assistance claim." kf at 872, ^|41. What record there is shows that counsel
simply dropped the ball.
II. The trial court did not have discretion to decline to rule on the Appellant's
pretrial discovery motions.
The State apparently does not dispute that the trial court failed to rule on Mr.
Reed's pretrial discovery motions, but argues rather that there is no record evidence that
the court so failed. Since the trial court's error consisted of failing to take a positive and
mandatory action, i.e., ruling on the motions, and since such a ruling, either for or against
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the Defendant, would have created a tangible record in any case, the absence of any such
ruling in the record must be taken as proof positive that the trial court never ruled. Rule
12(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure does not give such an option to the trial
court. The court must either rule on the motion or create a record demonstrating good
cause why it is deferring such a ruling. Those are the only two options. Simply failing to
act at all is not an option, yet that is precisely what the trial court did, as acknowledged by
the State. Aplee Br. at 12. In other words, there is no question that the trial court violated
Rule 12(e). The court's violation of Rule 12(e) being indisputable, the sole remaining
question is the extent to which Mr. Reed was prejudiced by this failure. Once again, the
issue before the jury was whether Mr. Reed had a gun.
Preliminary Hearing Testimony. On December 3, 2007, trial counsel made an
expedited requested for a copy of the preliminary hearing transcript prior to trial. Trial
was held on December 19, 2007, without the transcript. Indeed, the transcript was not
added to the record until February 19, 2009, in anticipation of this appeal. At the
preliminary hearing on October 18, 2007, Orlando Martinez testified that Mr. Reed was
standing in the dark about 10 feet away. 163:11. By the time of trial on December 19,
2007, Mr. Martinez had decided to move Mr. Reed about 4 feet closer. 165:1 3 1. At the
preliminary hearing on October 18, 2007, Mr. Martinez acknowledged that he had just
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consumed a six pack of beer before the encounter with Mr. Reed, a considerable amount.
163:22. Two months later, this had dried up two wine coolers and a single beer, leaving
Mr. Martinez a far more sober witness. 165:147. Ms. Miya noted for the record that she
couldn't refute Mr. Martinez' trial testimony without the preliminary hearing transcript
she had properly requested, and for which she had properly requested a ruling. Icf Since
the issue was whether Mr. Reed possessed a gun, Mr. Martinez's distance from Mr. Reed
and Mr. Martinez's lack of sobriety, together with the discrepancy between his prior and
trial testimony were critical to undermining his credibility before the jury. But for the
court's failure to act on his motions, Mr. Reed would have had the necessary evidence.
Criminal histories, Fingerprint evidence, Dispatch tapes. The record is clear that
the defense was never provided with any criminal histories, fingerprint evidence, or
dispatch tapes. The record is equally clear that they are not in the record because the trial
court never ordered that they be produced, notwithstanding the defense's requests.
Needless to say, the criminal history of a prosecution witness is highly probative of the
witness's credibility. The absence of fingerprint evidence can be just as significant as the
results of fingerprint evidence, and cross-checking an officer's recollection of a dispatch
against the actual tape is a routine method of examining an officer's credibility.
It is the Defendant's prerogative, not the State's, to determine whether the
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requested information is exculpatory or not. State v. Martin, 984 P.2d 975, 979,1999 UT
72. The failure to establish whether such evidence existed is "not harmless error because
such strong impeachment evidence would go to the central issue of the case" IcL If such
evidence has now been lost or destroyed, the Defendant is entitled to a dismissal. State v.
Tiedemann, 162 P.3d 1106, 1112-1117,2007 UT 49. The State does not explain how Mr.
Reed is now to be held responsible for the record failing to include evidence which the
same record indicates Mr. Reed properly requested, and which the same record indicates
is absent precisely because the court, not Mr. Reed, failed to act.
Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states in pertinent part:
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the
defense upon request the following material or information of which he has
knowledge:
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or
codefendant;
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on
good cause shown should be made available to the defendant in
order for the defendant to adequately prepare his defense.
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable
following the filing of charges and before the defendant is required to
plead. The prosecutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure.
Failure to make disclosure of pertinent defense evidence constitutes a denial of due
process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. State v. Martin,
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984 P 2d at 979 When the State fails to make such a disclosure, the burden is upon the
State to demonstrate that such non-disclosure is not prejudicial to the defense Id_, State v
Knight, 734 P 2d 913, 921 (Utah 1987) This is evidence Mr Reed specifically requested,
e\idence which the court and the State denied him, yet for which the State now would
Mr Reed responsible for not finding in the record
Examination

and fingerprinting

of the gun-cleaning

kit allegedly found in the

vehicle The alleged gun-cleaning kit was never produced at trial Mr Reed's only
knowledge that one even existed came from the arresting officers, not from any personal
knowledge 165 217 The alleged existence of a gun-cleanmg kit was used by the State to
bolster Mr Martinez's testimony that Mr Reed had a gun The requested examination
(34) would have clearly established whether such a kit even existed at all, and the
requested fingerprinting, if done as requested, could have positively excluded Mr Reed
as the possessor of the kit Refuting Mr Reed's implied connection with the gun-cleanmg
kit would have seriously undercut the case against him But for the trial court's failure to
act on the motion explicitly requesting this evidence, it would have been available for Mr
Reed's defense Again, one must ask what more Mr Reed could have done to obtain this
evidence, or why he should now be held responsible for its absence in the record,
notwithstanding his efforts 7
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CONCLUSION
The State's entire response to Mr. Reed's appeal is that none of the requested
evidence is in the record, thus proving Mr. Reed's point: Mr. Reed specifically requested
the evidence in question and specifically asked the trial court to act prior to trial. Trial
counsel failed to subpoena an essential defense witness and failed to object when the
State failed to subpoena her. Notwithstanding the efforts of trial counsel, the trial court
failed to rule on motions essential to the defense, in direct contravention of Rule 12(e). In
sum, Mr. Reed was denied a fair trial because he was denied essential defense evidence.
His conviction should therefore be vacated and a new trial ordered.
DATED this 10th day of February, 2010.

Michael L. Humiston
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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